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  This paper shows a detail-free idea of multi-object large double auction design in 
general trading environments, where the auctioneer randomly divides agents into two 
groups, and agents in each group trade at the market-clearing price vector in the other group. 
With private values, any dominant strategy profile mimics price-taking behavior, and the 
auctioneer achieves approximate efficiency. With interdependent values, any twice 
iteratively undominated strategy profile mimics fully revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium, and the auctioneer approximately achieves ex post efficiency. We need only a 
very weak common knowledge assumption on rationality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The hypothesis of perfect competition assumes that traders, or agents, are non-
strategic, and adopt price-taking behavior. In order to provide its strategic foundation, 
several works after Wilson (1977) investigated naïve models of large private value double 
auction with a single object, where many sellers and buyers announce their supply and 
demand functions, and trade at the market-clearing price. With the continuum of agents, 
every agent has a dominant strategy to behave as a price taker, because her demand or 
supply never influences the market-clearing price. As long as the number of agents is finite, 
however, each agent may be able to manipulate the market-clearing price on behalf of her 
benefit. In fact, each agent has no dominant strategy, and is involved in complicated 
strategic interaction. Hence, most of these works replaced dominant strategy with Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium. Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994) showed that in the 
independent private signal case with single-unit demands and supplies, any symmetric 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if exists, approximates price-taking behavior. Fudenberg, 
Mobius, and Szeidl (2003) investigated the correlated private signal case with single-unit 
demands and supplies, and showed the existence of approximately efficient symmetric 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Jackson and Swinkels (2004) investigated a variety of multi-
unit double auctions with private values, and showed the existence of non-trivial mixed 
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The analyses of Bayesian Nash equilibrium typically 
assume that, not only the model specification such as payoff and information structures, but 
also agents’ rational behavior, is common knowledge among all agents. This assumption is 
quite restrictive, especially in large economies. Hence, the strategic foundation without 
such common knowledge assumptions is very important to consider. 
  Based on the above observations, the present paper investigates alternative models of 
double auction instead of the naïve models, and shows the possibility that, in a very wide 
class of multi-object and multi-unit trading environments, each agent has a dominant 
strategy that mimics price-taking behavior, and the auctioneer can achieve efficiency in the 
limit as the number of agents grows. We introduce a new idea of auction design, whose 
intuition is as follows. The auctioneer randomly divides sellers and buyers into two groups. 
Each seller (buyer) announces a supply function (demand function, respectively). The 
auctioneer deals with each group as being separate, and calculates the price vector that 
equalizes the total demand and supply in every commodity markets that are announced by 
the agents who belong to this group. And then, agents in each group trade at the market-
clearing price vector in the other group. Hence, each agent’s announcement never 
influences the price vector at which she trades. By specifying a rationing rule appropriately, 
the auctioneer succeeds to induce agents to announce honest competitive demands and 
supplies in every commodity market as their dominant strategies. The law of large numbers 
guarantees that the market-clearing price vector in each group converges in probability to 
the market-clearing price vector in the whole commodity markets that combine both groups. 
Hence, the auctioneer achieves efficiency in the limit as the number of agents grows, and 
our double auctions can be regarded as stochastic approximation of perfect competition.   3
  Of particular importance, our double auctions are detail-free in that the auctioneer 
needs no information about the model specification. This point is in contrast with the 
mechanism design literature, where the central planner possesses full knowledge on the 
model specification, and the designed mechanisms depend crucially on its fine detail. As 
Wilson (1987) has admonished, the restriction to detail-free mechanisms is very important 
to consider from the practical viewpoint. 
  Barberà and Jackson (1995) showed that in economic environments, any social choice 
function that is strategy-proof in terms of dominant strategy is inefficient, even in the limit 
as the number of agents grows. This impossibility relies on the restriction that excludes 
stochastic social choice functions that map preference profiles to lotteries over pure 
allocations. Gibbard (1977) and Benoit (2002) showed that in general social choice 
environments, no non-trivial stochastic social choice function is strategy-proof. In contrast 
to these works, this paper shows that stochastic decision does play a powerful role, 
particularly in economic environments. 
  This paper assumes that agents’ preferences are quasi-linear and risk neutral. With this 
assumption, Vickery (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) designed so-called VCG 
mechanisms, where truth-telling is a dominant strategy and achieves efficiency. The 
drawback of their works is that the VCG mechanisms do not satisfy budget-balancing. 
McAfee (1992) showed an alternative idea of double auction design, where the budget is 
not balanced, but the budgetary deficit never occurs. McAfee’s analysis relies crucially on 
the assumption that each buyer (seller) has only single-unit demand (supply, respectively). 
In contrast to these works, our double auctions satisfy budget-balancing, and can be applied 
to the very general private value cases with multi-object and multi-unit demands and 
supplies, where we allow any mixture of complements and substitutes for each trader. 
  The basic idea of random grouping can be applied to the interdependent value case 
also, where each agent’s payoff depends, not only on her private signal, but also on the 
other traders’ private signals. The auctioneer randomly divides sellers and buyers into two 
groups. Each buyer (seller) announces a triplicate of messages, where the first message is a 
demand (supply) function, and the latter two messages are demand (supply, respectively) 
functions contingent on the other agents’ first messages. The auctioneer calculates the 
market-clearing price vector in each group according to the second messages announced in 
this group. Agents in the other group, almost certainly, trade at this price vector, where the 
auctioneer uses their third messages as their demands and supplies. With small but positive 
probability, all agents trade at a randomly chosen price vector, where the auctioneer uses 
their first messages as their demands and supplies. This will provide agents with the 
incentive to announce competitive demand and supply functions honestly as their first 
messages. Hence, with a minor informational condition, agents’ first messages will fully 
reveal their private signals. Based on this intuition, the present paper designs detail-free 
double auctions in the Bayesian framework, where any iteratively undominated strategy 
profile describes price-taking behavior, is fully revealing, and achieves ex post efficiency in 
the limit as the number of traders grows. 
This possibility result is closely related to rational expectations equilibrium in 
competitive economies. Since the seminal work by Lucas (1972), the notion of rational 
expectations equilibrium has been pervasive in many fields of economics. The rational   4
expectations equilibrium hypothesis assumes that agents act rationally with respect to 
information, while they adopt price-taking behavior in a non-strategic way. In order to 
provide its strategic foundation, Reny and Perry (2003) investigated naïve models of single-
object and single-unit double auction with interdependent values and with finite agents. 
Reny and Perry showed that when agents’ private signals are strictly affiliated and the 
number of agents is sufficiently large, there exists a fully-revealing and approximately 
efficient pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium that mimics price-taking behavior. 
The rational expectations hypothesis presumes that all agents’ rational behavior is 
common knowledge among them. In fact, even with the continuum of agents, price-taking 
behavior is never described by dominant strategy. In contrast to rational expectations 
equilibrium, this paper needs to assume only a very weak common knowledge assumption 
on rationality, i.e., assume only that it is common knowledge among all agents that any 
agent never plays dominated strategies. Hence, all we need to do for derivation of 
iteratively undominated strategies is to check only two rounds of iterative removal of 
dominated strategies. Moreover, the set of iteratively undominated strategy profiles satisfies 
interchangeability, i.e., any combination of strategies that survive after two rounds of 
iterative removal is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
This paper covers a very wide class of trading environments even with interdependent 
values. We do not require the private signals to be affiliated. We allow multiple objects to 
be traded. We allow any mixture of complements and substitutes for every agent. 
  The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 considers the private value case. 
Subsection 2.1 shows the model. Subsection 2.2 designs double auction mechanisms. 
Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 show that price-taking behavior is described by dominant strategies 
and the auctioneer can achieve efficiency in the limit as the number of agents grows. 
  Section 3 considers the interdependent value case. Subsection 3.1 shows the model. 
Subsection 3.2 designs double auction mechanisms. Subsections 3.3 and 3.4 show that 
price-taking behavior is described by twice iteratively undominated strategy profiles and 
the auctioneer can achieve ex post efficiency in the limit as the number of agents grows, 
where it is assumed that only buyers have interdependent values. Subsection 3.5 extends 
our analysis to the general interdependent case, where the auctioneer randomly divides 
agents into three or more groups. 
 
   5
2. Private Values 
 
  This section assumes private values in that each agent receives no information about 
the other agents’ payoffs that they do not know. 
 
2.1. The Model 
 
There exist  n 4  agents, where the first  n 2  agents are called sellers, and the latter  n 2 
agents are called buyers. There are k   different commodities to be traded. Seller 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈   can supply each commodity up to l  units.  Buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  will 
demand each commodity up to l units. Fix a positive integer T  arbitrarily, which may be 
sufficiently large. Let 
k
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Seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  sells the amount  } ,..., 0 { ) ( l h xi ∈  of commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  at the unit 
price  P h qi ∈ ) ( . Buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  buys  the  amount  ) (h xi  of  commodity  h  at  the 
unit price  ) (h qi . Equalities (1) imply that the total buying and selling amounts are balanced. 
Equality (2) implies budget balancing in that buyers’ payments and sellers’ revenues are 
balanced. Let A denote the set of allocations. Let ∆  denote the set of simple lotteries over 
allocations. Agent  s i'   payoff function with expected utility hypothesis is given by 
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2.2. Auction Design 
 
We consider the following mechanism denoted by 
* G , where sellers and buyers are 
randomly divided into groups 1 and 2. Each seller announces a supply function, whereas 
each buyer announces a demand function. Almost certainly, sellers in group 1 (group 2) 
trade with buyers in group 1 (group 2) at the price vector that approximates the market-
clearing price vector in group 2 (group 1, respectively). 
We construct  ) , (
* g M G =   as follows. Let D   denote the set of functions 
k l P d } ,..., 0 { : → . Let 
D Mi =  for all  } 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
where we denote 
k
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one-to-one mappings  } 4 ,..., 1 { } 4 ,..., 1 { : n n → φ  where 
} 2 ,..., 1 { ) ( n i ∈ φ  for all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
and 
} 4 ,..., 1 2 { ) ( n n i + ∈ φ  for all  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ . 
A function  Φ ∈ φ  implies permutations on the set of sellers  } 2 ,..., 1 { n  and on the set of 
buyers  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n+ . Sellers  ) ( ),..., 1 ( n φ φ  and buyers  ) 3 ( ),..., 1 2 ( n n φ φ +  belong to group 1. 
Sellers  ) 2 ( ),..., 1 ( n n φ φ +  and  buyers  ) 4 ( ),..., 1 3 ( n n φ φ +   belong to group 2. For every 
M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , we define 
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group 2, i.e., 
n
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2
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market-clearing price vectors in group 1 and group 2, respectively. 
Fix  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ  arbitrarily. With probability  2 ) ! 2 (
1
n
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and 
    ) , ( ˆ
*
) 2 ( ) ( m p q q i n i φ φ φ = = +  for all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n n i + ∈ . 
Hence, in each group, sellers and buyers trade at the approximate market-clearing price 
vector in the other group. 
We specify the selling and buying amounts 
n
n i i n i x x
2
1 ) 2 ( ) ( ) , ( + = + φ φ   in group 1 in the 
following way. Fix any commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  arbitrarily. If there exists excessive supply 
in group 1, i.e., 
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Each buyer buys the same amount of commodity h as what she intends to demand. Each 
seller before  ) ˆ (i φ  sells the same amount of commodity h as what she intends to supply, 
whereas each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ  cannot sell commodity h. If there exists excessive demand 
in group 1, i.e., inequality (3) does not hold, then 
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Each seller sells the same amount of commodity h as what she intends to supply. Each 
buyer before  ) ˆ 2 ( i n+ φ   buys the same amount of commodity h   as what she intends to 
demand, whereas each seller after  ) ˆ 2 ( i n+ φ  cannot  buy  commodity  h . We specify the   8
selling and buying amounts 
n
n i i n i x x
2
1 ) 2 ( ) ( ) , ( + = + φ φ   in group 2 in the same way. Note that 
) , ( ) , (
* q x m a = φ  satisfies equalities (1) and (2). 
 
2.3. Dominant Strategies 
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technology is described by a cost function  ) , 0 [ } ,...., 0 { : ∞ →
k
i l c , where  0 ) 0 ,..., 0 ( = i c . 
Each seller  s i'  payoff for allocation  ) , ( q x  is given by a quasi-linear form 
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which implies seller  s i'  payoff-maximizing supply when she is a price taker. For every 
buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , let  D Di ⊂  denote the set of functions d  such that for every  P p∈ , 
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which implies buyer  s i'  payoff-maximizing demand when she is a price taker. 
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The former part of Condition 1 implies that each seller’s production technology has no 
externality among different commodities, and the unit cost for each commodity is non-  9
decreasing. The latter part of Condition 1 implies that we do not allow any mixture of 
complements and substitutes among different commodities, and the unit valuation for each 
commodity is non-increasing. 
 
Theorem 1:  Suppose that Condition 1 holds. Then, for every  } 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , a message 
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Proof: For every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , each seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  receives the payoff given by 
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) , ( ~* m p qi φ =  if seller i belongs to group 1, 
and 
) , ( ~* m p qi φ =  if seller i belongs to group 2, 
which implies that  i q   does not depend on  i m , and therefore, seller  s i'  message  never 
influences the price vector at which she trades. Hence, it follows from the specification of 
) , (
* m a φ  and the former part of Condition 1 that  i m  always maximizes the value (4) if and 
only if  i i D m ∈ . (Under the former part of Condition 1, seller i always prefers any selling 
amount of each commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  closer  to  ) )( ( h q m i i  where  i i D m ∈ . This implies 
that she is willing to announce any message in  i D  even if she may sell only less than what 
she intends to supply.) It is clear that any message in  i D  provides seller i  with a non-
negative payoff. 
For every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , each buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  receives the payoff given by 
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where ) , ( ) , (
* m a q x φ = , 
) , ( ~* m p qi φ =  if buyer i belongs to group 1, 
and 
) , ( ~* m p qi φ =  if buyer i belongs to group 2, 
which implies that  i q   does not depend on  i m , and therefore, buyer  s i'  message  never 
influences the price vector at which she trades. Hence, it follows from the specification of 
) , (
* m a φ  and the latter part of Condition 1 that  i m  always maximizes the value (5) if and 
only if  i i D m ∈ . (Under the latter part of Condition 1, buyer i always prefers any buying 
amount of each commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  closer to  ) )( ( h q m i i , where  i i D m ∈ . This implies   10
that she is willing to announce any message in  i D  even if she can buy only less than what 
she intends to demand.) It is clear that any message in  i D  provides buyer i with a non-
negative payoff. Hence, we have proved this theorem. 
Q.E.D. 
 
2.4. Asymptotic Efficiency and Generalization 
 
 For  every 0 > ε   that is close to zero, a message profile  M m∈   is said to be 
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is more than  ε − 1 . This implies that it is almost certain that all agents trade at almost the 
same price vector. 
We will show that when the number of agents is sufficiently large, the mechanism 
* G  
satisfies approximate efficiency and uniform pricing as follows. Denote 
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Hence, ) (
* p ρ   approximates the excessive supply when n   is sufficiently large and all 
agents play price-taking behavior. For every  1 ≥ n  and every 
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which approximates the market-clearing price vector associated with all trades. Assume 
that for every infinite sequence of message profiles 
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is sufficiently large and all agents play price-taking behavior. For every sufficiently large n, 
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Since whether each agent belongs to group 1 or group 2 is determined according to the 
uniform distribution on Φ, it follows that for every sufficiently large n and every message 
profile 
) ( ) ( n n M m ∈ , it is almost certain that both  ) , ( ˆ
) ( ) *( n n m p φ  and  ) , ( ~ ) ( ) *( n n m p φ  are 
approximated by  ) (
) ( ) *( n n m p . Hence, whenever property (6) holds, then it is almost certain 
that both  ) , ( ˆ
) ( ) *( n n m p φ  and  ) , ( ~ ) ( ) *( n n m p φ   are approximated by 
* p . From these 
observations, we have proved the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 2: For every  0 > ε , there exists a positive integer 
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  We will show that whenever n is sufficiently large, then the result of Theorem 1 holds 
even without Condition 1. Assume that for every agent  } 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
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) *( ) ( n
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Since the number of agents is sufficiently large and agents are randomly divided into 
groups 1 and 2 according to the uniform distribution on Φ, it follows that for each seller 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  (each buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ ), it is almost certain that she can sell (buy) the 
same amount of each commodity as what she intends to sell (buy, respectively), i.e., 
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* G . 
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) *(n m   does not satisfy ex post individual 
rationality in 
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Hence, we have proved the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 3:  There exists a positive integer 
* n   such that for every 
* n n ≥ , 
) *(n m i s   t h e  
unique dominant message profile in  ) ) ( , (
4
1




n u G = , and it satisfies participation constraint. 
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3. Interdependent Values 
 
  This section assumes interdependent values in that each agent’s payoff depends on the 
other agents’ private signals. 
 
3.1. The Model 
 
We modify the model by assuming that each agent receives a private signal  i ω . Let 
i Ω  denote the finite set of private signals for agent  } 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈ . The probability of private 
signal profile  ∏
=









1 ) (ω ω  occurring is given by  ] 1 , 0 ( ) ( ∈ ω f . Each agent  s i'  
payoff function with the expected utility hypothesis is redefined as  R A ui → Ω × :.  F o r  




i i a a u u ) ( ) , ( ) , ( α ω ω α , where Γ   is the support of α . A 
strategy for agent i is defined as a function  i i i M s → Ω : , where agent i with private signal 
i i Ω ∈ ω  announces  i i i M s ∈ ) (ω . Let  i S  denote the set of strategies for agent i. 
A combination  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =  defines a Bayesian game. The expected payoff for agent 
i  with  private  signal  i ω   when agents play strategy profile  ∏
=









1 ) ( i n   t h e  
Bayesian game  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =   is denoted by  ∑
− − Ω ∈
− =
i i
i i i i i i f s g u s u
ω
ω ω ω ω ω ) | ( ) )), ( ( ( ) , ( , 
where 
∑















) | ( . Let  i i S S =
0 . Recursively, for every  1 ≥ r , let  i
r
i S S ⊂  
denote the set of strategies 
1 − ∈
r
i i S s  for agent i such that there exists no 
1 − ∈ ′
r
i i S s  such that 
    ) , , ( ) , ( i i i i i i s s u s u ω ω − ′ ≥ ′  for all  i
r
i i i S s Ω × ∈ ′
−
− −
1 ) , ( ω , 
with strict inequality for some  i
r
i i i S s Ω × ∈ ′
−
− −


















i S S . Let 
r
i r i S S
∞ →








. A strategy profile  S s∈   is said to be 
iteratively undominated in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =  if 
∞ ∈S s . The set of iteratively undominated 
message profiles 
∞ S  in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =  is said to be twice dominance solvable if 
2 S S =
∞ . 
The set of iteratively undominated message profiles 
∞ S  in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =   is said to be 
interchangeable if every iteratively undominated strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i = , i.e., for every 
∞ ∈S s , every  } 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
    ) , , ( ) , ( i i i i i i s s u s u ω ω − ′ ≥  for all  i i S s ∈ . 
   14
3.2. Auction Design 
 
We consider the following mechanism  ) , (
* * g M G =   where sellers and buyers are 
randomly divided into groups 1 and 2. Each seller announces a supply function, whereas 
each buyer announces a triplicate of messages, i.e., messages 1, 2, and 3. As message 1, she 
announces a demand function. As message 2, she announces a demand function conditional 
on the first messages of buyers in the same group as her. As message 3, she announces a 
demand function conditional on the first messages of all buyers. Almost certainly, the 
members of each group trade at the approximate market-clearing price vector based on the 
second messages of buyers in the other group. 
Let Ξ   denote the set of functions  D D
n → : θ . Let W   denote the set of functions 
D D w
n →
2 : . For every seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , let 
    D Mi = . 
For every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , let 
   
3 2 1
i i i i M M M M × × = , 
D Mi =
1 ,  Ξ =
2
i M , and  W Mi =
3 . 
We denote 
3 2 1 3 2 1 ) , , ( i i i i i i i M M M m m m m × × ∈ = , and denote any strategy for each buyer 
} 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  by  S s s s s i i i i ∈ = ) , , (
3 2 1 , where  D s i i → Ω :
1 ,  Ξ → Ωi i s :
1 , and  W s i i → Ω :
1 . 
For every  M m∈ , let 
n n
i i n





1 , ) ( ∈ = = +  denote the first message profile of all buyers. 
For every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , let 
n n
i i n
b D m m ∈ = = + 1
1
) 2 (
, 1 , ) ( ˆ φ
φ  denote the first message profile of 
buyers in group 1. For every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , let 
n n
n i i n





, 1 , ) ( ~
φ
φ  denote the first 
message profile of buyers in group 2. Based on buyers’ second messages, for every 
M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , we define 
] )} )( )( ˆ ( ) )( ( { max [ min arg ) , ( ˆ
1
, 1 2







i n i k h P p
h p m m h p m m p
φ
φ φ φ , 
and 











i n i k h P p
h p m m h p m m p
φ
φ φ φ , 
where we assume that  ) , ( ˆ
* * m p φ  () , ( ~ * * m p φ ) does not depend on the messages announced 




, 0 ( ∈ η  arbitrarily, which is close to zero. Fix  Φ ∈ φ ,  P p∈ , and  M m∈  arbitrarily. 
With probability 
T n
2 ) ! 2 (
η
, the mechanism 
* * G  chooses  ) , ( ) 1 , , , (
* * q x m p a = φ  where  for 
every  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
p q q i n i = = + ) 2 ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) ( ) 2 (
1
) 2 ( ) 2 ( i n i n i n q m x + + + = φ φ φ .   15
Each buyer buys the same amounts as what she intends to demand according to her first 
message. With probability 
T n
2 ) ! 2 (
η
, 
* * G  chooses  ) , ( ) 2 , , , (
* * q x m p a = φ   where for every 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
p q q i n i = = + ) 2 ( ) ( φ φ , 
) )( ˆ ( ) 2 (
, 1 , 2
) 2 ( ) 2 ( i n
b
i n i n q m m x + + + = φ
φ
φ φ  if  n i ≤ , 
and 
) )( ~ ( ) 2 (
, 1 , 2
) 2 ( ) 2 ( i n
b
i n i n q m m x + + + = φ
φ
φ φ  if  1 + ≥ n i . 
Each buyer buys the same amounts as what she intends to demand according to her second 
message conditional on the first messages of buyers in the same group as her. With 
probability 
T n
2 ) ! 2 (
η
, 
* * G  chooses  ) , ( ) 3 , , , (
* * q x m p a = φ  where for every  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
p q q i n i = = + ) 2 ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) )( ( ) 2 (
1 , 3
) 2 ( ) 2 ( i n
b
i n i n q m m x + + + = φ φ φ . 
Each buyer buys the same amounts as what she intends to demand according to her third 
message conditional on the first messages by all buyers. With probability 
T n
2 ) ! 2 (
3 1 η −
, 
* * G  
chooses ) , ( ) 4 , , , (
* * q x m p a = φ  where for every, 
    ) , ( ~ * *
) 2 ( ) ( m p q q i n i φ φ φ = = +  for all  } ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
    ) , ( ˆ
* *
) 2 ( ) ( m p q q i n i φ φ φ = = +  for all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n n i + ∈ , 
and 
) )( ( ) 2 (
1 , 3
) 2 ( ) 2 ( i n
b
i n i n q m m x + + + = φ φ φ  for all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ . 
Agents in group 1 (group 2) trade at the approximate market-clearing price vector in group 
2 (group 1, respectively). Each buyer buys the same amounts as what she intends to 
demand according to her third message conditional on the first messages of all buyers. 
We specify the selling amount  ) (i xφ  of each seller  ) (i φ  in group 1 as follows, where 
) , , , ( ) , (
* * b m p a q x φ = ,  } 4 ,..., 1 { ∈ b , and  } ,..., 1 { n i∈ . Fix any commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  
arbitrarily. There exists  } ,..., 1 { ˆ n i ∈  satisfying the following properties. Suppose that there 
exists excess supply in group 1, i.e.,  














) ( ) ( ) ( ) )( ( φ φ φ . 
Then, 















j n i h x h x h x φ φ φ ) )( ( ) ( ) ( h q m i i φ φ ≤  if  i i ˆ = , 
and 
0 ) ( ) ( = h x i φ  if  i i ˆ > .   16
Suppose that inequality (7) does not hold. Then, 
l h x i = ) ( ) ( φ  if  i i ˆ < , 
∑ ∑
+ = =










) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( φ φ φ ) )( ( ) ( ) ( h q m i i φ φ ≥  if  i i ˆ = , 
and 
    ) )( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( h q m h x i i i φ φ φ =  if  i i ˆ > . 
If there exists excess supply in group 1, then, each seller before  ) ˆ (i φ  can sell the same 
amount as what she intends to supply, whereas each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ  sells zero amount. If 
there exists excess demand in group 1, then, each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ  can sell the same amount 
as what she intends to supply, whereas each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ   has to sell the maximal 
amount l. In the same way, we specify the selling amounts in group 2. 
 
3.3. Iterative Dominance 
 
We specify the model as follows. Each seller  s i'  production technology is described 
by ) , 0 [ } ,...., 1 { } ,..., 1 { : ∞ → Ω × × l k ci , where 
) , , ( ) , 1 , ( ω ω l h c h c i i ≤ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤  for all  Ω ∈ ω  and all  } ,..., 1 { k h∈ . 
Hence, each seller’s production technology has no externality among different commodities, 













) , , ( ) , ( ω ω . 
Each seller  s i'  payoff for allocation  ) , ( q x  is described by 
) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , , (
1
ω ω i i
k
h
i i i x c h x h q q x u − =∑
=
. 
Each buyer  s i'  valuation is described by  ) , 0 [ } ,..., 0 { : ∞ → Ω ×
k
i l v , where  0 ) , 0 ,..., 0 ( = ω i v . 
We allow any mixture of complements and substitutes among different commodities. Buyer 






i i i i i h x h q x v q x u
1
) ( ) ( ) , ( ) , , ( ω ω . 
For every subset  } 4 ,..., 1 { n N ⊂ , we denote  N j j N ∈ = ) (ω ω ,  N n N \ } 4 ,..., 1 { = − , 
N j j N ∉ − = ) (ω ω , 
∑























i i N i i f x c x c
ω







i i N i i f x v x v
ω
ω ω ω ω ) | ( ) , ( ) , ( . We denote  } {i i ω ω = . For every seller 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , we define  D D i i ⊂ ) (ω  as the set of functions 
k l P d } ,..., 0 { : →  such that for 
every  P p∈ ,   17
    ) ] , ( ) ( ) ( [ max arg ) (






x c h x h p p d
k
i
ω − ∈ ∑
= ∈
, 
which implies seller  s i'  profit-maximizing supply when she is a price taker and receives 
private signal  i ω . For every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , we define  D D i i ⊂ ) (ω  as the set of 
functions 
k l P d } ,..., 0 { : →  such that for every  P p∈ , 
    ] ) ( ) ( ) , ( [ max arg ) (





i i i i
l x




which implies buyer  s i'  payoff-maximizing demand when she is a price taker and receives 
private signal  i ω . 
The private signal structure satisfies symmetry in that there exist  s Ω  and  b Ω  such that 
    s i Ω = Ω  for all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
    b i Ω = Ω  for all  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , 
and that for every  Ω ∈ ω  and every  Ω ∈ ′ ω , 
) ( ) ( ω ω ′ = f f  if there exists  Φ ∈ φ  such that  ) (i i φ ω ω = ′  for all 
} 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ . 
We assume that for every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } { \ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(8)     φ ω ω = ′) ( ) ( i i i i D D I . 
This implies that no buyer has the same payoff-maximizing demand function between 
different private signals. Based on this assumption, for every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  and 
every  i i Ω ∈ ω , we define  Ξ ⊂ Ξ ) ( i i ω   as the set of functions  D D
n → : θ  such  that  for 
every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ  and every  i i − − Ω ∈ ω , if  ) 1 2 ( + = n i φ , and 
) ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (
1
) 2 ( j n j n j n D m + + + ∈ φ φ φ ω  for all  } ,..., 1 { n j∈ , 
then 
] ) ( ) ( ) ˆ , ( [ max arg ) )( ˆ (
1
,
} ,..., 0 {









b h x h p x v p m
k
i






b Ω ∈ = = + 1 ) 2 (
, ) ( ˆ φ





b Ω ∈ = = + 1 ) 3 (
, ) ( ~
φ
φ ω ω  denote the private signal profile of buyers in group 2. Because of 
symmetry, we can replace  } ,..., 1 { n j∈  and 
φ ω
, ˆ
b  with  } 2 ,..., 1 { n n j + ∈  and 
φ ω
, ~b , 
respectively. Any element of  ) ( i i ω Ξ  implies  buyer  s i'  payoff-maximizing  demand 
function when she is a price taker and receives full information about the private signals for 
all buyers in the same group as her. For every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
we define  W W i i ⊂ ) (ω  as the set of functions  D D w
n →
2 :  such that for every  M m∈  and 
every  i i − − Ω ∈ ω , if 
    ) (
1
j j j D m ω ∈  for all  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n j + ∈ , 
then   18
] ) ( ) ( ) , ( [ max arg ) )( (




















1 ) 2 ( ) ( Ω ∈ = = + φ ω ω  denotes the private signal profile of all buyers. Any element 
of  ) ( i i W ω  implies buyer  s i'  payoff-maximizing demand function when she is a price taker 
and receives full information about the private signals for all buyers. 
 
Condition 2: For every  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ ,  ) , ( ω i i x c  is  independent  of  i i − − Ω ∈ ω . For every 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  and every  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n j + ∈ ,  ) , ( ω j j x v  is independent of  j j Ω ∈ ω . 
 
The former part of Condition 2 implies that all sellers have only private values. The 
latter part implies that we allow interdependent values only in the buyers’ side. 
 
Theorem 4: Suppose that Condition 2 holds. Then, a strategy profile  S s∈  is iteratively 
undominated in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1
* * f u G
n
i i =   if and only if for every seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  and  every 
i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(9)     ) ( ) ( i i i i D s ω ω ∈  
and for every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(10)     ) ( ) (
1
i i i i D s ω ω ∈ ,  ) ( ) (
2
i i i i s ω ω Ξ ∈ , and  ) ( ) (
3
i i i i W s ω ω ∈ . 
The set of iteratively undominated message profiles in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1
* * f u G
n
i i =  is twice dominance 
solvable and interchangeable. 
 
Proof: For every  } 4 ,..., 1 { ) , , ( × × Φ ∈ P b p φ , each seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈   receives the payoff 





i i x c h x h q ω − ∑
=
, where  ) (ω s m =  and  ) , , , ( ) , (
* b m p a q x φ = . Note that 
i m  never  influences  i q . Note from the former part of Condition 2 that  i q  includes  no 
information relevant to seller  s i'  cost condition. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
seller i belongs to group 1, i.e.,  ) ( j i φ =  for some  } ,..., 1 { n j∈ . (We can apply the same 
argument when she belongs to group 2.) Fix any commodity  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  arbitrarily. 
Suppose that there exists excess supply in group 1, i.e., inequality (7) holds. If  i j ˆ > , 
then 0 ) ( = h xi , and seller i cannot change the selling amount by changing her message. If 
i j ˆ ≤ , then 
















i n h x h x h r φ φ , 
and she can change the selling amount into  )] ( ), )( ( min[ h r h q m i i′  by announcing any  i m′ 
instead of  i m .   19
Next, suppose that inequality (7) does not hold. If  i j ˆ < , then  l h xi = ) (,  a n d  s h e  
cannot change the selling amount by changing her message. If  i j ˆ ≥ , then 
















) 2 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( φ φ , 
















i n h x h x h r φ φ , 
and she can change the selling amount into  )] ( )], ( ), )( ( max[min[ h r h r h q m i i′  by announcing 
any  i m′  instead  of  i m . Since seller  s i'   production technology satisfies no production 
externality and non-decreasingness, it follows from the above observations that a strategy 
i s  for seller i is dominant, i.e., 
) ), ( ( ) ), ), ( ( ( i i i i i i i m g u m s g u ω ω ω ≥ −  for all  i i Ω ∈ ω  and all  M m∈ , 
if and only if  ) ( i i i D m ω ∈  for all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
  Consider the case of  1 = b . For every  P p × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , each buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  
receives the payoff given by 





i i i i h x h q x v
1
) ( ) ( ) , ( ω , 
where  ) (ω s m =  and  ) 1 , , , ( ) , (
* m p a q x φ = . Note that  i m  never influences  i q , ) (
1
i i i q m x = , 
and buyer i can change the buying amount into  ) (
1
i i i q m x ′ =  by announcing any  i m′ instead 
of  i m . Hence, buyer i can always maximize the expected value of (11) conditional on  i ω  
by announcing  ) ( ) (
1
i i i i D s ω ω ∈  for  any  i i Ω ∈ ω . Since the first message for buyer i  is 
relevant to buyer  s i'  allocation only in the case of  1 = b , it follows that if a strategy  i s  for 
buyer i is included in 
1
i S , then it must hold that  ) ( ) (
1
i i i i D s ω ω ∈  for all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Suppose that a strategy profile  S s∈  satisfies  that  ) ( ) ( i i i i D s ω ω ∈  for  all  sellers 
} 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , and  ) ( ) (
1
i i i i D s ω ω ∈  for all buyers  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ . Fix  P p × Φ ∈ ) , (φ  and a 
buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈  arbitrarily, where, without loss of generality, assume that buyer i 
belongs to group 1, i.e.,  ) 2 ( j n i + =φ  for some  } ,..., 1 { n j∈ . 
Consider the case of  2 = b . Buyer i   receives the payoff given by (11) where 
) (ω s m =  and  ) 2 , , , ( ) , (
* m p a q x φ = . Note that  i m  never  influences  i q , and 
) )( ˆ (
, 1 , 2
i
b
i i q m s x
φ = . Equality (8) implies that 
φ , 1 , ˆ
b m  includes full information about 
φ ω
, 1 , ˆ
b . 
Hence, buyer i can always maximize the expected value of (11) conditional on 
φ ω
, 1 , ˆ
b  by 
announcing  ) ( ) (
2
i i i i s ω ω Ξ ∈  for  any  i i Ω ∈ ω . Since the second message for buyer i  is   20
relevant to buyer  s i'  allocation only in the case of  2 = b , it follows that if a strategy  i s  for 
buyer i is included in 
2
i S , then it must hold that  ) ( ) (
2
i i i i s ω ω Ξ ∈  for all  i i Ω ∈ ω . 
Consider the case of either  3 = b  or  4 = b . Buyer i receives the payoff given by (11) 
where  ) (ω s m =  and  either  ) 3 , , , ( ) , (
* m p a q x φ =  or  ) 4 , , , ( ) , (
* m p a q x φ =   . Note that  i m  
never influences  i q , and  ) )( (
, 1 , 2
i
b
i i q m s x
φ = . Equalities (8) imply that 
φ , 1 , b m  includes full 
information about all buyers’ private signals 
φ ω
, b . Note from the latter part of Condition 2 
that  i q  includes no additional information relevant to buyer  s i'  valuation, whenever she 
knows 
φ ω
, b . Hence, buyer i can always maximize the expected value of (11) conditional 
on 
φ ω
, b  by announcing  ) ( ) (
3
i i i i W s ω ω ∈  for any  i i Ω ∈ ω . Since the third message for buyer 
i   is relevant to buyer  s i'   allocation only in the cases of  } 4 , 3 { ∈ b , it follows that if a 
strategy  i s  for  buyer i   is included in 
2
i S , then it must hold that  ) ( ) (
3
i i i i W s ω ω ∈  for all 
i i Ω ∈ ω . 
The above arguments imply that for every agent  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , any 
strategy included in 
2
i S  is a best reply to every strategy profile for the other agents that is 
included in 
2
i S− . This implies 
2 S S =
∞ , and every strategy profile in 
2 S  is a Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium. 
Q.E.D.   21
3.4. Asymptotic Efficiency 
 
We further specify the model as follows. We introduces an unobservable macro shock 
0 ω . Let  0 Ω  denote the finite set of macro shocks. The probability of macro shock  0 ω  





) , ( ) ( 0
ω






i i f f f
4
1





















− − Ω ∈ = . There exist  ] 1 , 0 [ : ) | ( 0 → Ω ⋅ s s f ω  and 
] 1 , 0 [ : ) | ( 0 → Ω ⋅ b b f ω  such  that 
    ) | ( ) | ( 0 0 ω ω ⋅ = ⋅ s i f f  for  all  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , 
and 
    ) | ( ) | ( 0 0 ω ω ⋅ = ⋅ b i f f  for  all  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ . 
There exist  ) , 0 [ } ,..., 0 { } ,..., 1 { : 0 ∞ → Ω × Ω × × s l k c  and  ) , 0 [ } ,..., 0 { : 0 ∞ → Ω × Ω × b






) | ( ) , , , ( ) , , ( 0 0
ω






) | ( ) , , ( ) , ( 0 0
ω











f = . Hence, each agent’s payoff depends on the other agent’s 
private signals only through the macro shock. For every seller  } 2 ,..., 1 { n i∈ , let 







i i i i i
i




0 0 } ) , , , ( ) ( ) ( { ) , , , ( ω ω ω ω . 
For every buyer  } 4 ,..., 1 2 { n n i + ∈ , let 







i i i i i
i




0 0 } ) ( ) ( ) , , , ( { ) , , , ( ω ω ω ω  
We will show that when the number of agents is sufficiently large, the mechanism 
* * G  satisfies approximate efficiency with full information about the macro shock and 
approximate uniform pricing. For every  0 > ε  that is close to zero, a strategy profile 
S s∈  is said to be  − ε efficient in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =  if for every  0 0 Ω ∈ ω , the probability 
conditional on macro shock  0 ω  of the mechanism G  choosing any allocation  A a∈  
according to  M s ∈ ) (ω  such  that   22
ε
ω ω ω ω
≤





















is more than  ε − 1 . For every  0 > ε  that is close to zero, a strategy profile  S s∈  is said 
to be  − ε uniform pricing in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =  if for every  Ω ∈ ω , the probability of the 
mechanism  G  choosing any allocation  ) , ( q x  according to  M s ∈ ) (ω  such that for 
every  } ,..., 1 { } 4 ,..., 1 { ) , ( k n h i × ∈  and  every  } 4 ,..., 1 { n j∈ , 
ε ≤ − ) ( ) ( h q h q j i  
is more than  ε − 1.  
The intuition of our arguments is as follows. For every  0 > ε , whenever n  is 
sufficiently large, then the probability conditional on any macro shock  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  that all 






1 2 ) ( Ω ∈ = + = ω ω  satisfies 











 for  all  b b Ω ∈ ω  
is larger than  ε − 1 . This holds true even if we replace 
b ω  with  either 
φ ω
, ˆ
b  or 
φ ω
, ~b . We 
assume that for every  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  and  every  } /{ 0 0 0 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(12)     ) | ( ) | ( 0 0 ω ω ′ ⋅ ≠ ⋅ b b f f . 
This implies that the probability distribution of each buyer’s private signal occurring is 




b  or 
φ ω
, ~b , each buyer can receive almost full information about the 
unobservable macro shock  0 ω . Note that whether each agent belongs to group 1 or group 2 
is determined according to the uniform distribution on Φ . Remember equalities (8) 
implying that the first message announced by any buyer according to price-taking behavior 
includes full information about her private signal. Hence, it follows from inequalities (12) 
that whenever  n is sufficiently large, then it is almost certain that both  ) , ( ˆ
* * m p φ  and 
) , ( ~ * * m p φ  are approximated by the market-clearing price vector associated with all trades 
under full information about the macro shock. 
  Based on the above intuition, for every  0 0 Ω ∈ ω , fix a continuous function 
R
k → ] 1 , 0 [ : ) ( 0
* * ω ρ  and 
k p ] 1 , 0 [ ) ( 0
* * ∈ ω  arbitrarily, where  ) 0 ,..., 0 ( )) ( )( ( 0
* *
0 = ω ω ρ p . 
Fix an infinite sequence 
∞
= Ω 1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , , , , ( n









n η . 
Hence, for sufficiently large  n, the set of price vectors 
) (n P  is approximated by 
k ] 1 , 0 [,  
and it is almost certain that agents trades at the price vector  ) , ( ˆ
) ( ) ( * * n n m p φ  or 
) , ( ~ ) ( ) ( * * n n m p φ . Here, the set of macro shocks  0 Ω  does  not depend on  n. 
We assume that inequalities (12) hold for all  1 ≥ n   in the strict sense, i.e., there exists   23
0 > ξ   such that for every  0 0 Ω ∈ ω , every  } /{ 0 0 0 ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , and every  1 ≥ n , 
(13)     ξ ω ω ω ω
ω
≥ ′ − ∑





b f f ) | ( ) | ( 0
) (
0
) ( . 
We also assume that for every infinite sequence of price vectors 
∞
=1
) ( ) ( n
n p , every 
k p ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ , 
and every infinite sequence of strategy profiles 
∞
=1
) ( ) ( n
n s , whenever 
) (n s  satisfies 
properties (9) and (10), implying price-taking behavior for all  1 ≥ n , and 




) ( lim , 
then, for every  0 > ε , there exists n  such that for every  n n ≥ , the probability 
conditional on any macro shock  0 0 Ω ∈ ω   that the realized private signal profile 
) ( ) ( n n Ω ∈ ω  satisfies 
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n












is larger than  ε − 1 , where 
n















i n i n s m + + + = ω . Hence,  ) )( ( 0
* * p ω ρ  
almost surely approximates the excessive supply based on all buyers’ third messages when 
n is  sufficiently  large. 
For every  1 ≥ n , every 
) ( ) ( n n S s ∈ , and every 
) ( ) ( n n Ω ∈ ω , we define 
) , (







) ( ) (
} ,..., 1 { ) ( ∑
=











i k h P p
h p m s h p s
n ω ω , 
where 
n















i n i n s m + + + = ω . Hence,  ) , (
) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω  approximates the 
market-clearing price vector associated with all trades based on all buyers’ third messages. 
We assume that for every infinite sequence of strategy profiles 
∞
=1
) ( ) ( n
n s , whenever 
) (n s  
satisfies properties (9) and (10) for all  1 ≥ n , then, for every  0 > ε , there exists  n  such 
that for every  n n ≥ , the probability conditional on any macro shock  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  that the 
realized private signal profile 
) ( ) ( n n Ω ∈ ω  satisfies 
ε ω ω ≤ − ) ( ) , ( 0
* * ) ( ) ( ) ( p s p
n n n  
is larger than  ε − 1 . Hence,  ) ( 0
* * ω p   almost surely approximates the market-clearing price 
vector associated with all trades based on all buyers’ third messages when n  is 
sufficiently large. From inequalities (13), it follows that  ) ( 0
* * ω p  almost  surely 
approximates the market-clearing price vector associated with all trades under full 
information about the macro shock when  n is sufficiently large. For every sufficiently 
large  n and for every strategy profile 
) (n s  satisfying properties (9) and (10), it is almost 

















) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ∑
= ∈
ω ω
 conditional   24
on ) , (
) (
0
n ω ω  approximates the average payoff when all agents trade at the uniform price 
vector  ) ( 0
* * ω p   as price takers with full information about the macro shock. Since whether 
each agent belongs to group 1 or group 2 is determined according to the uniform 
distribution on  Φ, it follows that for every sufficiently large  n  and every strategy profile 
) (n s , it is almost certain that both  )) ( , ( ˆ
) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω φ  and  )) ( , ( ~ ) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω φ  are 
approximated by  )) ( (
) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω . Hence, whenever 
) (n s   satisfies properties (9) and (10), 
then both  )) ( , ( ˆ
) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω φ  and  )) ( , ( ~ ) ( ) ( ) ( * * n n n s p ω φ  are almost surely approximated by 
) ( 0
* * ω p . From the above arguments, we have proved the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 5:  For every  0 > ε , there exists a positive integer 
* * n  such that for every 
* * n n ≥ , any strategy profile 
) (n s  satisfying properties (9) and (10) is  − ε efficient and 
uniform − ε  pricing  in  ) , ) ( , (
) ( 4
1




n f u G = . 
  
We can show that any strategy profile with properties (9) and (10) satisfies 
participation constraints as follows. Suppose that for every n and every 
) ( ) ( n
s
n
s Ω ∈ ω , 
there exist  0 0 Ω ∈ ω  and  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  such that  ) ( ) , , ( 0
* * ) ( ) ( ω ω p l h c
n
s
n < . Then, every 
seller can earn a positive interim expected payoff whenever she trades at the market 
clearing price vector  ) ( 0
* * ω p . When  n  is sufficiently large, it is almost certain that every 
seller trades at almost the same price vector as  ) ( 0
* * ω p   and can sell the same amounts as 
what she intends to supply. (Note that any buyer always buys the same amounts as what she 
intends to demand.) Hence, it follows that for every sufficiently large n, any strategy 
profile 
) (n s s =  with properties (9) and (10) satisfies participation constraints in the 
Bayesian game  ) , ) ( , ( ) , ) ( , (
) ( 4
1







i i f u G f u G = = =   in the sense that for every 
} 4 ,..., 1 { n i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
    0 ) | ( ) )), ( ( ( ≥ ∑
− − Ω ∈
−
i i
i i i f s g u
ω




This subsection investigates the case where Condition 2 does not hold, and therefore, 
all sellers and buyers have interdependent values in the general sense. We modify the 
model by assuming that there exist  rn 2  agents, where  3 ≥ r  is an integer, the first  rn  
agents are sellers, and the latter rn  agents are buyers. We construct the following 
mechanism denoted by  ) , ( g M G =
+ , where sellers and buyers are randomly divided into 
r   distinct groups. We redefine Φ   as the set of one-to-one mappings 
} 2 ,..., 1 { } 2 ,..., 1 { : rn rn → φ  where  } ,..., 1 { ) ( rn i ∈ φ  for  all  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , and 
} 2 ,..., 1 { ) ( rn rn i + ∈ φ  for  all  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn rn i + ∈ . For every  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β ,  n  sellers   25
) ( ),..., 1 ) 1 (( n n β φ β φ + −  and  n  buyers  ) ) (( ),..., 1 ) 1 (( n r n r β φ β φ + + − +  belong  to 
group  β . For every agent  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , let 
   
3 2 1
i i i i M M M M × × = , 
    D Mi =
1 , 
   
2
i M   is the set of functions  D D m
n
i →
2 2 : , 
and 
   
3
i M   is the set of functions  D D m
n r
i →
− ) 1 ( 2 3 : . 
In contrast with 
* * G , not only buyers but also sellers announce triplicates of messages. We 
denote any strategy for each agent  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈  by  S s s s s i i i i ∈ = ) , , (
3 2 1 , where 
1 1 : i i i M s → Ω , 
2 2 : i i i M s → Ω , and 
3 3 : i i i M s → Ω . Let 
rn rn
i i D m m
2 2
1
1 1 ) ( ∈ = =  denote the 
first message profile of all agents. Let 
n
i i n r i n m m m 1 ) ) 1 (( ) ) 1 ((
, ) , ( = + − + + − = β θ β θ
θ β  denote the 
message profile of all agents in group  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β . Let 
n
i i n r i n m m m 1
1
) ) 1 ((
1
) ) 1 ((
, 1 , ) , ( = + − + + − = β φ β φ
φ β  
denote the first message profile of all agents in group  β . Let  } { \ } ,..., 1 {
, 1 , , 1 , ) ( β β
φ β φ β
r m m ∈ ′
′ − =  
denote the first message profile of all agents who do not belong to group  β . 
For every  M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ  and  every  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β , we define 
] )} )( )( ( ) )( )( ( { max [ inf arg ) , , (
1 ) 1 (
, 1 , 1 2
) (
, 1 , 1 2









i rn i k h P p






φ β φ , 
where ) , , ( m p β φ
+  does not depend on the messages 
φ β , 1 − m  announced in the precedent 
group  1 − β . (Here, we denote  r = −1 1  and  1 1= + r .) Hence,  ) , , ( m p β φ
+  
approximates the market-clearing price vector based on the second messages announced by 
all agents in group  β , where they are informed of the first messages announced in the 




, 0 ( ∈ η  denote an arbitrary positive real number that is close to zero. Fix 
M m × Φ ∈ ) , (φ  and  P p∈   arbitrarily. With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  chooses 
) , ( ) 1 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) (
1
) ( ) ( ) ( p m x x i i rn i φ φ φ = = + . 
Each seller sells the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to supply 
according to her first message, whereas each buyer  ) ( i rn + φ   has to buy the same amount 
of each commodity as what seller  ) (i φ  intends to supply. With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  
chooses ) , ( ) 2 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) (
1
) ( ) ( ) ( p m x x i rn i rn i + + = = φ φ φ . 
Each buyer buys the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to demand   26
according to her first message, whereas each seller  ) (i φ  has to sell the same amount of 
each commodity as what buyer  ) ( i rn+ φ   intends to demand according to her first message. 
With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  chooses  ) , ( ) 3 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every 
} ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  every  } ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) )( (
, 1 , 1 2




+ = = . 
Each seller sells the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to supply 
according to her second message conditional on the first messages of the agents in the 
subsequent group  1 + β , whereas each buyer  ) ( i rn + φ  has to buy the same amount of 
each commodity as what seller  ) (i φ  intends to supply. With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  
chooses ) , ( ) 4 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  every 
} ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) )( (
, 1 , 1 2




+ + = = . 
Each buyer buys the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to demand 
according to her second message conditional on the first messages of the agents in the 
subsequent group  1 + β , whereas each seller  ) (i φ  has to buy the same amount of each 
commodity as what buyer  ) ( i rn+ φ  intends to demand. With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  
chooses ) , ( ) 5 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  every 
} ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) )( (
, 1 , 3




+ = = . 
Each seller sells the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to supply 
according to her third message conditional on the first messages of all agents who no not 
belong to group  β , whereas each buyer  ) ( i rn + φ  has to buy the same amount of each 
commodity as what seller  ) (i φ  intends to supply. With probability 
T rn
2 ) ! (
η
, 
+ G  
chooses ) , ( ) 6 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ   such that for every  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  every 
} ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ , 
p q q i rn i = = + ) ( ) ( φ φ  and  ) )( (
, 1 , 3




+ + = = . 
Each buyer buys the same amount of each commodity as what she intends to demand 
according to her third message conditional on the first messages of all agents who do not 
belong to group β , whereas each seller  ) (i φ  has to buy the same amount of each 
commodity as what buyer  ) ( i rn + φ  intends  to  demand. 
With probability 
T n
2 ) ! 2 (
6 1 η −
, 
+ G  chooses  ) , ( ) 7 , , , ( q x m p a =
+ φ  such that for every 
} ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  every  } ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ ,   27
) 1 , , ( ) ( ) ( + = =
+ +
+ β φ φ φ m p q q i rn i  and  )) 1 , , ( )( (
, 1 , 3
) ( ) ( + =
+ + −
+ + β φ
φ β
φ φ m p m m x i rn i rn . 
Agents in each group β   trade at the approximate market-clearing price vector 
) 1 , , ( +
+ + β φ m p   in the subsequent group  1 + β . Each buyer buys the same amount of each 
commodity as what she intends to demand according to her third message conditional on 
the first messages of all agents who do not belong to group  β . 
In the case of  ) 7 , , , ( ) , ( m p a q x φ
+ = , we specify the selling amount  ) (i xφ  for each 
seller  ) (i φ  as follows. Fix  } ,..., 1 { r ∈ β  and  } ,..., 1 { k h∈  arbitrarily. Suppose that seller 
) (i φ   belongs to group β , i.e.,  } ,..., 1 ) 1 {( n n i β β + − ∈ . There exists 
} ,..., 1 ) 1 {( ) , ( n n h i i β β β + − ∈ =
+ +  satisfying the following properties. Suppose that there 
exists excess supply in group  β , i.e.,   










j j h x h q m m
1
) ) 1 ((
1 ) 1 (
) (
, 1 , 3







    ) )( )( ( ) ( ) (
, 1 , 3
) ( ) ( h q m m h x i i i φ
φ β
φ φ
− =  if 
+ <i i , 
    ∑ ∑
−
+ − = =
+ − + − =
1
1 ) 1 (
) (
1






j n r i h x h x h x
β
φ β φ φ  
) )( )( ( ) (
, 1 , 3
) ( h q m m i i φ
φ β
φ
− ≤  if 
+ =i i , 
and 
0 ) ( ) ( = h x i φ  if 
+ >i i . 
Suppose that inequality (14) does not hold. Then, 
l h x i = ) ( ) ( φ  if 
+ <i i , 
∑ ∑
+ = =






j n r i h x l i h x h x
β




) ) 1 (( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (  
) )( )( ( ) (
, 1 , 3
) ( h q m m i i φ
φ β
φ
− ≥  if 
+ + = i i , 
and 
    ) )( )( ( ) ( ) (
, 1 , 3
) ( ) ( h q m m h x i i i φ
φ β
φ φ
− =  if 
+ + > i i . 
If there exists excess supply in group  β , then, each seller before  ) ˆ (i φ  can sell the same 
amount as what she intends to supply, whereas each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ   sells zero amount. If 
there exists excess demand in group  β , then, each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ  can sell the same 
amount as what she intends to supply, whereas each seller after  ) ˆ (i φ  has to sell the 
maximal amount  l. 
  We assume that for every  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , every  i i Ω ∈ ω , and every  } { \ i i i ω ω Ω ∈ ′ , 
(15)     φ ω ω = ′) ( ) ( i i i i D D I . 
This implies that no buyer has the same payoff-maximizing demand function between 
different private signals, and no seller has the same payoff-maximizing supply function   28
between different private signals. Based on this assumption, for every buyer 
} 2 ,..., 1 { rn rn i + ∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , we define 
2 2 ) ( i i i M M ∈
+ ω  as the set of functions 
2 2
i i M m ∈  such  that  for  every  Ω ∈ ω  and  every  i i M m − − × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , if  ) 1 ( + = rn i θ , and 
) ( ) ( ) (
1
) ( j j j D m φ φ φ ω ∈  for  all  } ) 2 ( ,..., 1 ) 1 {( } 2 ,..., 1 { n r n r n n j + + + + ∈ U , 
then 
] ) ( ) ( ) , ( [ max arg ) )( (
1
) , 2 (
} ,..., 0 {





i N i i
l x




φ ω , 
where  } 2 ,..., 1 { ) , ( rn N ⊂ φ β   is the set of members in group  β , i.e., 
)} ) 2 (( ),..., 1 ) 1 (( ), 2 ( ),..., 1 ( { ) , ( n r n r n n N + + + + = φ φ φ φ φ β . 
For every seller  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , we define 
2 2 ) ( i i i M M ∈
+ ω  as the set of 
functions 
2 2
i i M m ∈  such that for every  i i − − Ω ∈ ω  and every  i i M m − − × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , if 
) 1 ( + = rn i θ , and 
    ) ( ) ( ) (
1
) ( j j j D m φ φ φ ω ∈  for  all  } ) 2 ( ,..., 1 ) 1 {( } 2 ,..., 1 { n r n r n n j + + + + ∈ U , 
then 
)] , ( ) ( ) ( [ max arg ) )( ( ) , 2 (
1 } ,..., 0 {
, 1 , 2 2
φ











For every buyer  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn rn i + ∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , we define 
3 3 ) ( i i i M M ∈
+ ω  as the 
set of functions 
3 3
i i M m ∈  such that for every  i i − − Ω ∈ ω  and every  i i M m − − × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , if 
) 1 ( + = rn i θ , and 
) ( ) ( ) (
1
) ( j j j D m φ φ φ ω ∈  for  all  } ) 1 ( ,..., 1 {( } ,..., 1 { n r rn n j + + ∉ U , 
then 
] ) ( ) ( ) , ( [ max arg ) )( (
1
) , (
} ,..., 0 {
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ω U . 
For every seller  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , we define 
3 3 ) ( i i i M M ∈
+ ω  as the set of 
functions 
3 3
i i M m ∈  such that for every  i i − − Ω ∈ ω  and every  i i M m − − × Φ ∈ ) , (φ , if 
) 1 ( + = rn i θ , and 
) ( ) ( ) (
1
) ( j j j D m φ φ φ ω ∈  for  all  } ) 1 ( ,..., 1 {( } ,..., 1 { n r rn n j + + ∉ U , 
then 
)] , ( ) ( ) ( [ max arg ) )( ( ) , (
1 } ,..., 0 {



















Condition 3: For every seller  } ,..., 1 { rn i∈ , every  Ω ∈ ω , every  Ω ∈ ′ ω , and every 
Φ ∈ φ , if  i i ω ω ′ = ,  i = ) 1 ( φ , and  ) , ( ) , (
1 1
φ β φ β
β β
ω ω B B
≠ ≠
′ = U U , then for every 
k
i l x } ,..., 0 { ∈ , every 
k
i l x } ,..., 0 { ∈ ′ , and every  P p∈ ,   29
   [ ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
1 1






i x c h x h p x c h x h p ′ − ′ > − ∑ ∑
= =
] 
⇔ [) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) (
1 1








i x c h x h p x c h x h p ]. 
 
  Condition 3 implies that each seller does not need to know what the private signals 
that the other agents in the same group as her possess are whenever she knows the private 
signals of all agents who do not belong to the same group as her. When  r  is sufficiently 
large, it might be natural to assume Condition 3. 
  The first message of each seller (buyer) influences her payoff only in the case that the 
mechanism 
+ G  chooses  ) 1 , , , ( m p a φ
+  () 2 , , , ( m p a φ
+ , respectively). Hence, it follows 
that if a strategy profile s  is undominated, then it must hold that for every agent 
} 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(16)     ) ( ) (
1
i i i i D s ω ω ∈ . 
The second message of each seller (buyer) influences her payoff only in the case that the 
mechanism 
+ G  chooses  ) 3 , , , ( m p a θ
+  () 4 , , , ( m p a θ
+ , respectively). This, together with 
equalities (15), implies that if a strategy profile  s is  included  in 
2 S , then it must hold that 
for every agent  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(17)     ) ( ) (
2 2
i i i i M s ω ω
+ ∈ . 
The third message of each seller (buyer) influences her payoff only in the case that the 
mechanism 
+ G  chooses either  ) 5 , , , ( m p a φ
+  or  ) 7 , , , ( m p a φ
+  (either  ) 6 , , , ( m p a θ
+  or 
) 7 , , , ( m p a φ
+ , respectively). In the case of  ) 7 , , , ( m p a φ
+ , the residual total supply 
(demand) available to each buyer (seller, respectively) may include information about the 
private signals of the other agents of the same group as her. However, such information 
does not influence her choice of third message, because Condition 3 guarantees that she can 
maximize her payoff with full information about all agents’ private signals by observing 
only the first messages of the agents who do not belong to the same group as her. This 
observation, together with the assumption of no production externality and decreasingness 
of sellers’ const conditions, implies that if a strategy profile  s is included in 
2 S , then it 
must hold that for every agent  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and  every  i i Ω ∈ ω , 
(18)     ) ( ) (
3 3
i i i i M s ω ω
+ ∈ . 
From the above arguments, we can prove the following theorem in the same way as 
Theorem 4. 
 
Theorem 6: A strategy profile  S s∈   is iteratively undominated in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =
+  if and 
only if for every  } 2 ,..., 1 { rn i∈  and every  i i Ω ∈ ω , properties (16), (17), and (18) hold. 
The set of iteratively undominated strategy profiles in  ) , ) ( , (
4
1 f u G
n
i i =
+  is twice dominance 
solvable and interchangeable.   30
 
  Finally, we can apply the same argument as in Subsection 3.4 to the general 
interdependent value case, and show approximate efficiency, approximate uniform pricing, 
and participation constraints when the number of agents is sufficiently large. 
   31
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